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Competing on Good Politicians

We introduce a theoretical model where ideological parties select and allocate high-valence (experts) and low-valence (party loyalists) candidates into electoral districts.
Joint with Vincenzo Galasso

Moonlighting Politicians

When the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life.
Joint with Stefano Gagliarducci and Paolo Naticchioni

Competing on good politicians

Political competition may produce better governance. This column shows that Italian politicians shirk less when they are from a more closely contested district. But it’s not simply a re-election incentive – parties are more likely to choose qualified candidates rather than loyalists to run in contestable district, therefore putting better …
Tommaso Nannicini, Vincenzo Galasso
#politics