Do Fiscal Rules Matter?
Fiscal rules are laws aimed at reducing the incentive to accumulate debt, and many countries adopt them to discipline local governments.
Joint with Veronica Grembi and Ugo Troiano
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Number of results: 29
How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign
In collaboration with the reelection campaign of an Italian incumbent mayor, we administred messages about the candidate’s valence or ideology.
Joint with Chad Kendall and Francesco Trebbi
So Closed: Political Selection in Proportional Systems
We analyze political selection in a closed list proportional system where parties have strong gate-keeping power, which they use as an instrument to pursue votes.
Joint with Vincenzo Galasso
Meet the Press: How Voters and Politicians Respond to Newspaper Entry and Exit
This paper uses an original dataset covering the presence of local news in medium-large Italian cities in the period 1993–2010.
Joint with Francesco Drago and Francesco Sobbrio
Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection
The wage paid to politicians affects both the choice of citizens to run for an elective office and the performance of those who are appointed.
Joint with Stefano Gagliarducci
Assessing Economic Liberalization Episodes: A Synthetic Control Approach
We use transparent statistical methodology for data driven case studies to investigate the impact of economic liberalization on real GDP per capita in a worldwide sample of countries.
Joint with Andrea Stella, Guido Tabellini, and Ugo Troiano
Social Capital and Political Accountability
We investigate a channel through which social capital may improve economic wellbeing and the functioning of institutions: political accountability.
Joint with Andrea Stella, Guido Tabellini, and Ugo Troiano
The Political Resource Curse
The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data.
Joint with Fernanda Brollo, Roberto Perotti, and Guido Tabellini
Tying Your Enemy’s Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil
This article uses a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races to disclose purely political reasons in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in a federal state.
Joint with Fernanda Brollo